observed in Indonesia where local governments have created a range of syariah-inspired bylaws, most of which are directed at matters of public morality. In the province of Aceh, where the right to implement syariah law was part of a broader autonomy package intended to put an end to a decades-long civil war, an Islamic criminal code has been implemented since the early 2000s.
These developments can be interpreted as a sign of the increasing strength and appeal of political Islam, in combination with the influence of transnational organizations and networks (Van Bruinessen 2013), or explained as a result of the growing anxiety about religious identities (Sidel 2006) . But they also indicate changing interpretations of the 'proper' relation between state and citizen. The implementation of syariah-based laws in Malaysia and Indonesia amount to a reconceptualization of the positions of individual citizens vis-à-vis the state and other citizens. From a liberal-secular perspective, they amount to a massive infringement of personal freedom, an attack on women's rights, an unwarranted foray of state institutions in religious matters, and an intrusion of the state into the private sphere. From forbidding women to go out after dark, punishing homosexuals, penalizing extra-marital sex to banning alcohol and prescribing modest dress, they do not just impose physical punishments for moral transgressions but also aim to regulate several aspects of people's private lives. As such, they institute a form of differentiated citizenship, imposing different behavioural standards on Muslims and on women.
Yet, the lively and very heated debates about syariah-based regulations in Malaysia and Indonesia are rarely waged in liberal or secular terms. In both countries, ngos and religious leaders engage in public campaigns to support, adjust or counter the institutionalization and enforcement of Islamic morality, while 'ordinary' Muslims often express a critical stance toward the advances of normative Islam generally (Kloos 2015; Peletz 1997) . What stands out in this discussion, however, is the relative insignificance of liberal or secular discourse. Campaigns against hudud-and syariah-based regulations are not, generally, about defending individual rights. Instead, the debate is largely framed in terms of how, and in what ways, religious duties and injunctions need to be interpreted, and what role should be ascribed, in this process, to the state. In other words, conceptions of citizenship in both Indonesia and Malaysia are developing in interaction with evolving attitudes toward Islam, Islamic texts and discourses regarding 'proper' Islamic behaviour.
By this, we do not mean to say that Islamic piety and human rights (and related concepts such as pluralism or democracy) are incompatible. Quite in the contrary. As Robert Hefner (2011:60) has argued, the Muslim world in generaland democratic Indonesia in particular -has been characterized, as a result of a 'remarkable historical coincidence,' by a convergence between religious revival and a widely shared embrace of democratic discourse (cf. Künkler and Stepan
